The Zion Times

By Sachet A. Sullivan | The Zion Times
A high-speed pursuit that occurred over the summer involving multiple members of the Iron/Garfield/Beaver Narcotics Task Force left a suspect injured and hospitalized and triggered internal reviews, a resignation, and unresolved questions about the use of force involved.

Use-of-force (UOF) reports completed by involved officers document the actions taken during the arrest. Such reports are required when officers use force beyond routine control techniques during an arrest. While the reports received by TZT are heavily redacted, at least one supervisory review concluded that the force used was “not justified.”

What remains unclear is how the incident was handled internally beyond a reassignment of task force personnel and the resignation of one agent, who stepped down from law enforcement entirely. Conflicting accounts contained within the UOF reports raise broader questions about conduct inside the task force. Internal-affairs findings related to the pursuit have not been released, and officials declined to address personnel matters during a recent interview between TZT and the Cedar City Police Department.

In this TZT exclusive, we examine what the records show, what occurred during the pursuit and subsequent arrest, and what has not been disclosed anywhere else.

Pursuit and Use of Force

According to official records and use-of-force reports obtained by TZT through Utah’s Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), task force agents had just concluded a drug transaction involving a confidential informant when a high-speed pursuit began on Interstate 15. There are conflicting accounts regarding how task force agents became involved in the pursuit or whether they had the jurisdiction to intervene.

Agents stated they headed toward the scene “in case unmarked, plain-clothes officers were needed — a tactic they said can be useful when a suspect is fleeing from uniformed law enforcement.” Agents reported parking in the center median between mile markers 58 and 59. Moments later, agents observed the suspect’s vehicle run over spike strips that had been deployed south of their location. After the vehicle passed their position, agents pulled out from the median, activated their emergency lights, and followed behind it.

The vehicle then came to an abrupt stop directly in front of the agents. The driver reportedly grabbed a backpack, and attempted to flee on foot. After a short distance, the suspect tripped and fell, allowing an agent to catch up and land on top of him.

Use-of-force reports state that as agents attempted to place the suspect’s hands behind his back, his right arm was pinned beneath his body while his left arm remained extended toward a backpack beneath him. Agents reported believing the backpack may have contained a firearm or other weapon.

One agent reportedly had his department-issued firearm pointed at the suspect’s head and repeatedly yelled for him to stop reaching toward the backpack. As the struggle continued, another agent reported striking the suspect in the head and delivering multiple knee strikes while attempting to control the suspect’s right side.

Portions of the use-of-force reports describing this phase of the encounter are redacted. In an interview with TZT, the agent who later resigned said the redactions correspond to a moment during the struggle when he heard the other agent say, “my hand’s broke.” He said he then looked up and observed the agent’s hand swelling rapidly.

During the same encounter, the resigned agent reported being unable to re-holster his firearm after his shirt became caught in his plain-clothes holster, leaving him with only one free hand. With the struggle ongoing, he reported striking the suspect in the head with the muzzle of his firearm, causing a laceration that required medical treatment.

“I couldn’t get my gun in the holster still. And so I had either two decisions, either throw my gun away, which I wasn’t gonna do because I didn’t know what was in the backpack he was trying to reach for. Or, I made the decision to muzzle punch him in the back of the head. It was just a quick strike, it wasn’t anything full force. It gave him a small cut on the back on his head.” the agent told TZT.

Multiple sources familiar with the incident, including an officer directly involved, confirmed to TZT that the supervising officer broke his hand during the altercation and subsequently underwent surgery. The injury is not documented elsewhere in either use-of-force report reviewed by TZT, and references to it appear to be obscured by redactions.

It remains unclear why the documentation diverges between the two use-of-force reports. In the resigned agent’s report, the form reflects that the suspect was injured, and the resigned agent’s narrative describing his own actions during the encounter is largely unredacted. In the supervising officer’s report, the form indicates no injuries were reported. In both reports, however, the injury sections are redacted, and redactions also obscure references to the supervising officer’s hand injury.

Discipline and Resignations

Because task force members remain employees of their home agencies, any discipline stemming from task force incidents is handled internally by each participating department rather than through a centralized task force process.

In a TZT exclusive interview, the task force agent who has since resigned said discipline was being discussed over how the arrest was handled but he resigned prior to his scheduled pre-determination hearing. A predetermination meeting is an internal meeting where the recommended discipline is considered before a final decision is made.

TZT was unable to independently confirm the status or outcome of any disciplinary proceedings for the other agent involved, as internal-affairs records are not normally released and department officials declined to discuss personnel matters. Cedar City Police Chief Darin Adams, however, confirmed in an interview with TZT that because the agent resigned before the hearing, no pre-determination or final decision was ever made.

No public announcements were made regarding the internal investigation or leadership changes that followed shortly after the incident. A new task force commander has since quietly been assigned, and the resigned agent’s position has since been filled. The reason for the commander’s resignation has not been publicly explained, and it remains unclear whether it was connected to this specific investigation.

In an interview with TZT, an anonymous source close to the investigation told TZT that two additional internal-affairs complaints were filed shortly after this use-of-force incident, which he stated ultimately led to the commander’s resignation from his position on the task force. TZT attempted to contact the former task force commander and provide an opportunity to comment prior to publication but he declined the interview.

The Replacement

The Cedar City Police Department filled the task force commander position with a seasoned sergeant who has spent more than a decade in law enforcement. The replacement for the other agent, however, has not been immune from controversy over the last year.

As a professional courtesy and for the safety of the undercover agent, TZT has chosen not to publish his name. During a recent interview with Cedar City Police Chief Darin Adams, TZT asked whether there were concerns about the agent’s appointment, referencing his prior involvement in a raid on Retro Fitness that occurred one year ago this month.

In the search warrant affidavit for that raid, the officer stated under sworn and written testimony that a substance found on a desk inside the gym “was identified as cocaine.” However, no cocaine or other illegal contraband were ever recovered during the search, and no charges were filed against the gym owner for the allegations in the warrant.

Asked about the agent’s background and his involvement in prior task force operations, Chief Adams described him as a capable officer with significant leadership experience, stating that he “served in leadership for over 18 years in the National Guard” and that the department believed he would do a good job in the role.

TZT also asked whether the department or the task force governing board had concerns about the number of raid-style operations the agent participated in under prior task force leadership, or whether earlier task force conduct was considered in evaluating his current assignment. Chief Adams responded by reiterating his confidence in the officer and his belief that the appointment is an appropriate fit.

A Task Force With Split Oversight

The Iron/Garfield/Beaver Narcotics Task Force is a multi-agency unit staffed by the Cedar City Police Department, Iron County Sheriff’s Office, Garfield County Sheriff’s Office, Beaver County Sheriff’s Office, the Iron County Attorney and the Utah Highway Patrol.

The task force commander position rotates among participating agencies, though Cedar City Police Department has frequently held the role over the last decade.

According to Cedar City Police Chief Darin Adams, oversight of the Iron/Garfield/Beaver Narcotics Task Force is provided by a governing board consisting of chiefs from all law enforcement agencies in Iron County. That includes the Cedar City Police Department, Iron County Sheriff’s Office, Parowan Police Department, Enoch Police Department, Brian Head Marshal’s Office, Southern Utah University Police Department, Adult Probation and Parole, and the Utah Highway Patrol.

While the board has authority to assign or remove officers from task force positions, discipline is handled internally by each officer’s employing agency.

Internal Affairs reviews, suspensions, demotions, and other personnel actions must be handled by the officers’ employing agencies, resulting in significant incidents being reviewed in parallel rather than through a single, unified process.

Internal Strain and Cultural Tensions

In an interview with TZT, the task force agent who later resigned described broader internal pressures he believes contribute to incidents like the one under review.

According to the agent, a growing disconnect exists between department leadership and officers working on the ground. He said administrators often lack firsthand understanding of the situations officers encounter during arrests and investigations, and that decisions are made without sufficient input from those directly involved.

The agent also described what he characterized as a rigid internal culture, particularly around personal conduct. He said officers have faced discipline over appearance and lifestyle issues — including grooming standards, tattoos, profanity use and off-duty behavior — even when those matters were unrelated to job performance or public complaints.

In his view, this environment discourages discretion and initiative, and can leave officers feeling unsupported when they make split-second decisions in volatile situations. He said that includes actions taken while attempting to do the job as trained or in accordance with established case law, which he said department leadership did not fully understand.

“Case law is very clear — you don’t have to see a weapon to believe there’s a weapon if you can articulate why,” the agent said.

The standard case law the agent appears to be referring to stems from long-standing federal use-of-force doctrine, most notably the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, which evaluates officer actions based on whether a reasonable officer would perceive an imminent threat under the totality of the circumstances. Under that framework, officers are not required to visually confirm a weapon before using force, provided they can articulate specific, observable facts supporting a reasonable belief that a suspect posed an immediate danger.

Courts have routinely applied that standard in cases involving suspects who reach toward a waistband, bag, or pocket, ignore commands while making sudden or unexplained movements, or otherwise behave in ways that a reasonable officer could interpret as an imminent threat — even when no weapon is ultimately recovered. At the same time, courts emphasize that such determinations must be grounded in objective reasonableness, not subjective fear, assumptions, or generalized safety concerns.

2024 Retention Survey Inside CCPD

In late 2024, the Cedar City Police Department circulated an anonymous retention survey among staff. Utah law enforcement agencies are prohibited from unionizing, making internal surveys one of the few formal avenues available for officers to raise concerns.

Officers who attended a subsequent department-wide meeting to go over the results said the survey reflected low confidence in administrative support, communication challenges, and frustration with departmental direction. When TZT filed a records request under Utah’s Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) seeking the survey and its results, the request was denied on the grounds that the records contained personal identifiers. During an interview with TZT, however, Chief Adams stated the survey was entirely anonymous.

The survey has not been released publicly, but multiple officers told TZT in private conversations, they felt discouraged from discussing the results inside and outside the department.

Chief Adams denied these allegations in his interview, stating that “the results were quite positive, there were only one or two employees with negative feedback.”

Adams said the department later commissioned an independent staffing study that focused on current and future personnel needs. He separately stated that the department continually reviews its policies and tactics as part of an ongoing internal process, and that those evaluations were not part of the staffing study itself.

“We’re always evaluating policies, tactics, improvements and de-escalations” Chief Adams said.

Multiple officers have told TZT in private discussions that after the survey and the independent staffing study, the department adjusted how leadership communicates with officers and implemented broader policy changes intended to better meet their needs.

A Shift in How the Task Force Operates

Task force data contained in Cedar City Police Department annual reports shows a clear shift in how narcotics cases are being built and pursued now compared to the early 2010s.

From roughly 2010 through 2014, task force operations relied far less on confidential informants and search warrants, yet produced substantially higher numbers of felony distribution cases. During that period, officers served relatively few warrants and focused investigations on suppliers rather than users, resulting in consistent distribution-level arrests despite lower overall enforcement activity.

More recent reports show a markedly different approach. Task force operations now rely heavily on confidential informants and frequent search warrants, with a shift toward warrant-heavy enforcement that includes residential search warrants and raid-style operations, as well as roadside drug cases. Annual reports from 2023 and 2024 show increases in possession-based cases and firearm seizures involving individuals classified as restricted persons under Utah law — a designation that can include individuals prohibited from possessing firearms due to marijuana use.

Despite the expanded use of confidential informants, search warrants, and raids, felony distribution cases have declined sharply, while simple possession cases now make up a growing share of task force arrests. Prescription fraud investigations have also declined during this period, despite Utah continuing to face high rates of opioid misuse.

The contrast is notable: as the number of confidential informants and search warrants has increased, the number of supplier-level cases has fallen. In 2024, officers assigned to task force operations served 60 search warrants — more than four times the number recorded a decade earlier — while felony distribution arrests remained well below mid-2010s levels.

Why This Incident Matters

The pursuit and arrest described in this case did not occur in isolation. It unfolded within a task force environment that, for years, increasingly relied on warrant-heavy, military-style, raid-based enforcement tactics and frequent high-risk encounters. Annual reports show that the period leading up to this incident included a sharp rise in residential search warrants and multi-agency operations involving SWAT support. Records and interviews indicate that many officers assigned to the task force during that period also served on the Iron County SWAT Team, further blurring the line between narcotics enforcement and tactical operations, as the task force shifted away from supplier-level investigations toward more frequent street-level and possession cases.

That broader enforcement posture matters because it shaped how officers were deployed, how risk became normalized, and how quickly force was escalated in the field. Task force agents operate within a structure in which authority is split between a governing board and their home agencies, leaving unclear who is responsible for evaluating tactics if operations grow more aggressive or encounters more volatile.

When the pursuit with task force agents ended in a physical struggle, injuries, and conflicting use-of-force reports, the questions raised extend beyond whether individual agents acted appropriately in a single moment. They also include whether supervisors and oversight bodies bear responsibility for allowing these tactics to become routine over years without meaningful intervention — and whether this incident reflects isolated misconduct or the foreseeable result of tactics that had gone largely unchecked.

The UOF’s also raise unresolved questions about the allegations made by the agent who later resigned. In interviews with TZT, he said department leadership had become so focused on liability and the risk of lawsuits that officers working in the field felt unsupported, even when force was legally justified. He described an environment in which officers were discouraged from using force under nearly any circumstance out of concern that administrators would not defend their actions afterward. According to the agent, that dynamic contributes to hesitation and confusion during high-risk encounters, as well as how incidents were later documented and reviewed.

“They want us to beg and plead a hundred times to get someone to comply,” the agent said. “I’m not that type of cop. I’m going to ask you, then I’m going to tell you, and then I’m going to make you.” He said this approach and his views on the appropriate use of force — were one area where he and Chief Adams disagreed.

After his resignation, the agent said he raised similar concerns directly with Cedar City’s newly elected mayor. “You’re going to have an officer that is going to get hurt or killed,” he said. “Because the administration is putting so much fear into them that if they go hands-on with someone and someone gets hurt, they are not going to protect you — they’re going to throw you under the bus. That’s what they’ve shown time and time again.”

These claims cannot be independently verified from the heavily redacted records released to date, but they echo themes reflected elsewhere in the reporting — including internal strain, conflicting accounts, overtime hours and unresolved questions about how leadership balanced risk, liability, and officer decision-making during this time.

Adams said the study identified the need for additional staffing over a five-year period. For 2025, the Cedar City Council approved funding for four positions — three sworn officers and one civilian position. He said the study also recommended additional positions in future years, but that funding for those positions has not yet been approved. Cedar City Police Department annual reports show a significant rise in overtime during a period of rapid population growth in Cedar City and Iron County, as increasing call volume and service demands coincided with intensified task force activity. In March, CCPD presented an independent five-year staffing study to the Cedar City Council projecting a 7.7% annual increase in calls for service and concluding that existing staffing levels were insufficient to meet workload and response-time demands. The study recommended adding 12 patrol officers over five years, along with additional supervisory and civilian support positions, to relieve pressure on sworn personnel and improve oversight.

Adams said the recent staffing study documented the department’s staffing needs and informed budget discussions that led to positions being approved for 2025. He also emphasized that the city council has approved staffing positions and police vehicles in prior years as well, and wanted that acknowledged.

An earlier version of this article misstated the composition of the Iron/Garfield/Beaver Narcotics Task Force oversight board, the scope of a departmental staffing study, and the status of future staffing approvals. The article has been updated to clarify those points. TZT thanks Chief Adams for raising the factual issues addressed above.

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